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1 Introduction 
Assessing whether distributional changes are “pro-poor” has become increasingly 
important in the last decade—for early contributions, see inter alia Bourguignon 
(2004), Dollar and Kraay (2002), Eastwood and Lipton (2001), Ravallion (2001), 
IMF et al.(2000), and Collier and Dollar (2001)). Doing this requires fixing the 
concept of pro-poorness: this is usually related to the idea that the poor get “more” 
from growth than some predefined benchmark. An important issue is whether this 
benchmark should be absolute or relative. Another issue is whether pro-poor 
judgements should use distributional weights that vary across the poor. Yet one 
more important issue is where to draw the poverty line (in absolute or in relative 
terms). 
In assessing whether distributional changes are pro-poor, caution is thus 
needed for several reasons.  
First, the link made between growth and changes in poverty can be sensitive to 
the choice of poverty lines and poverty indices. For instance, even if the incomes 
of the poor always increased in line with average growth in the economy, the 
impact of growth on the headcount ratio (a popular choice among many possible 
poverty indices) would depend on the income density around the poverty line, and 
thus on the choice of that poverty line. Other poverty indices will almost always 
react quantitatively differently from the headcount following growth, and they may 
sometimes also move in a qualitatively opposite direction—for example, when 
growth decreases the incidence of poverty but increases its severity. 
Second, the impact of growth on absolute poverty is often different from its 
impact on relative poverty and relative inequality. Indeed, although positive 
income growth usually increases the absolute incomes of the poor, it does not have 
a systematic effect on their relative shares in total income. This can have 
immediate repercussions on whether growth can be considered unambiguously to 
be pro-poor. This is because the two leading views on how to make judgements of 
pro-poorness differ radically as to whether growth should be expected to change 
the incomes of the poor by at least some absolute amount—for absolute pro-poor 
views—or by at least some proportional amount—for relative pro-poor views.  
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For instance, the absolute pro-poor view will judge as equally pro-poor the 
following two changes in an income distribution: 1) the first one shows an increase 
of $1 in the incomes of everyone; 2) the second one shows an increase of $1 in the 
incomes of the poor and an increase of $10.000 in the incomes of everyone else. 
This is because the absolute pro-poor view attaches no weight to the relative 
impact of growth, and that it also incorporates an absolute definition of the poverty 
line. 
Conversely, the relative pro-poor view will judge as equally pro-poor two 
changes in an income distribution, a first one in which everyone sees his income 
fall by 50 percent, and a second one in which everyone sees his income increase 
by 50 percent. This is because the relative pro-poor view only considers the 
relative impact of growth. Both views are well illustrated in a collection of “one-
pagers” produced by UNDP (2009). 
To assess whether growth is pro-poor, it has therefore often been the practice 
of the previous literature first to distinguish between absolute and relative pro-
poorness, and then to focus on summary pro-poor measures with fixed poverty 
lines and with separate absolute and relative settings. Influential examples include 
Dollar and Kraay (2002), Kakwani et al. (2003), Kakwani and Pernia (2000), 
Klasen (2004), and Ravallion and Chen (2003); see also Araar et al. (2009) for a 
review.  
This paper follows a different route by investigating how pro-poor judgements 
can be made robust to the choice of pro-poor evaluation functions and to the 
choice of poverty lines, in a joint absolute and relative setting. This in the spirit of 
Sen (1981)'s view that it may not be desirable to choose between the two settings, 
and that the joint use of the two settings may be useful to assess whether 
development is being pro-poor or not: 
“Indeed, there is an irreducible core of absolute deprivation in our idea of 
poverty, which translates reports of starvation, malnutrition and visible 
hardship into a diagnosis of poverty without having to ascertain first the 
relative picture. Thus the approach of relative deprivation supplements rather 
than supplants the analysis of poverty in terms of absolute dispossession” (Sen 
1981: 17). 
We investigate jointly absolute and relative pro-poorness by considering classes of 
pro-poor evaluation functions that can show varying distribution sensitivity to the 
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assessment of the impact of growth, be it in an absolute or in a relative setting. 
This is done in the spirit of the poverty dominance literature, and this also allows 
considering ranges of possible poverty frontiers within which to define the sets of 
the poor, absolutely and relatively speaking. 
More generally, the methodological procedures introduced in this paper are also 
procedures for testing whether poverty comparisons can be made robustly over 
classes of indices that incorporate both absolute and relative views of poverty. 
Besides addressing robustness to whether pro-poor judgements should be absolute 
or relative, the procedures also enable to check for whether pro-poor judgements 
are robust to choosing over a class of weights to aggregate the impact of growth on 
the poor as well as over ranges of absolute and relative poverty lines.  
The testing procedures are applied to the assessment of distributional changes in 
five middle- and four lower-income African countries, using data on household 
incomes (as opposed to aggregate income data, as captured for instance by GDP 
estimates). The results exemplify the significantly different impacts that growth 
has had over the last two decades in Africa.  
The rest of the paper runs as follows. Section 2 formalizes this paper's assessment 
of the pro-poorness of growth, using both relative and absolute approaches and 
standards. Section 3 applies the techniques to relatively recent distributional 
changes in nine African countries. It also positions the results within the policy 
and economic environment in which these countries have recently evolved. 
Section 4 concludes by summarizing the main conclusions of the paper. 
2 Assessing Absolute and Relative Pro-Poorness 
We start Section 2.1 by drawing from Duclos et al. (2006) in order to make general 
poverty comparisons based on multidimensional indicators of welfare. Section 2.2 
then describes how this general framework can be adapted to the important special 
case of comparing absolute and relative poverty using monetary indicators such as 
income or consumption. Section 2.3 provides a graphical discussion of the 
framework. 
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2.1 The General Setting 
Let a distribution of absolute (a) and relative (r) individual-level welfare indicators 
be given by F j(a, r) at time j, j = A, B. Absolute indicators of welfare will serve to 
assess whether growth has been absolutely pro-poor; relative indicators of welfare 
(namely, indicators of one's welfare relative to that of others) will serve to evaluate 
whether growth has been relatively pro-poor. These indicators can themselves be 
based on any variable (or combinations of variables) of interest, such as 
consumption, income, wealth, education or health, on which we would like to 
assess the impact of growth and distributional changes on poverty. Absolute 
indicators will be defined in the application section below by dollar values of 
consumption, and relative indicators will be given by those dollar values as a 
percentage of average consumption. 
Then denote by: 
 
0),(,0),(²:),( ≥
∂
∂
≥
∂
∂
ℜ→ℜ
r
ra
a
rara λλλ  (1) 
 
a summary indicator of the overall degree of joint absolute and relative welfare of 
an individual with (a, r). Note that the derivative conditions in (1) mean that both 
absolute and relative welfare can each contribute to increasing overall welfare.  
For poverty measurement, we typically wish to focus on those with the 
greatest degree of overall deprivation. This can be done by drawing a frontier 
separating those with lower and greater welfare. We can think of this frontier as a 
series of points at which overall welfare is kept constant. This frontier is assumed 
to be defined implicitly by λ(a, r) = 0. The set of those over whom we want to 
aggregate overall deprivation is then obtained formally as: 
 
Λ(λ) = {(a, r) |(λ(a, r) ≤ 0} (2) 
 
Consider Figure 1 with thresholds za and zr in dimensions of indicators a and r. 
Figure 1 allows comparing different views for identifying poor individuals in a 
multidimensional context; see for instance Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), 
Duclos et al. (2006) and Alkire and Foster (2009). λ1(a, r) gives an “intersection” 
view of joint deprivation: it considers someone to be overall deprived only if he is 
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deprived in both of the dimensions a and r, and therefore if he lies within the 
dotted rectangle of Figure 1. All of those within that dashed rectangle will then be 
considered deprived. Since this measure of deprivation will have an important role 
to play later on, we will refer to it as an intersection headcount of joint deprivation, 
defined jointly over absolute and relative welfare as: 
 
∫ ≤≤= ).,()()(),( radFzrIzaIzzH jraraj  (3) 
 
where )(•I  is an indicator function that equals 1 if its argument is true and 0 
otherwise, and ),( raF j  is the distribution function at time j over a and 
r. ),( ra
j zzH  is thus the proportion of j's total population that is deprived in both a 
and r. 
Figure 1: Deprivation in the space of absolute and relative welfare 
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Other views and frontiers of joint deprivation can also be applied. λ2(a, r) (the 
L-shaped, dotted line) gives a “union” frontier: it considers someone to be overall 
deprived if he is deprived in either of the two dimensions, and therefore if he lies 
below or to the left of the dashed line. Finally, λ3(a, r) provides an intermediate 
approach. According to that approach, someone can be overall deprived even if r 
> zr, so long as his a value is sufficiently low to lie to the left of λ3(a, r) = 0, and 
vice versa. 
We are then interested in computing an aggregate index of overall deprivation 
based on the joint distribution of a and r. Note that this aggregate index does not 
have to aggregate over the summary indicator ),( raλ ; it can aggregate over 
another indicator of individual deprivation, also function of of a and r. We focus 
on classes of overall deprivation indices that are additive across individuals. An 
additive deprivation index for the distribution at time j that combines the two 
dimensions of welfare of a and r is defined as: 
 
∫∫Λ= )( ),,();,(),( λ λπλπ radFraP
jj  (4) 
 
where ),( λπjP  is the aggregate index of poverty at time j, and π(a, r; λ) is the 
contribution (the “individual-level poverty”) to aggregate deprivation of an 
individual with absolute and relative welfare given by a and r. The double integral 
in (4) integrates over all those values of a and r that obey condition (2). Note that 
),( λπjP  depends both on λ  and π . This is a source of concern since it is not 
easy to agree on who exactly should be deemed to be poor (the role of λ ) and on 
how to quantify their degree of deprivation (the role of π ). 
We will say that the movement from time A to time B is pro-poor if and only if 
PA (π, λ) ≥ PB (π, λ). Again, whether the change will be deemed pro-poor will 
depend on the way in which λ, π, a and r are chosen. One of the main objectives of 
this paper is indeed to show how assessments of pro-poorness can be made robust 
to some of these choices. 
To do this, let us for now assume that a choice of indicators a and r has been 
made. Assume first for simplicity that π in (4) is left differentiable with respect to 
a and r and denote by πa and πr the first-order derivatives — which include the 
effect of a and r on λ(a, r) — of π (a, r; λ(a, r)) with respect to a and r, and let πar 
be the derivative of πa with respect to r. 
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We can then define the following classes of joint absolute/relative deprivation 
indices: 
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The first line of (5) says that an index P(π, λ) in Π(λ+) can add up the 
deprivation of of any possible sets Λ(λ) of deprived individuals so long as they are 
parts of a larger set Λ(λ+). The set Λ(λ+) is thus to be understood as the broadest 
set of deprived individuals that the class of indices Π(λ+) can take into account.  
The second line of (5) says that those with (a, r) just at the deprivation frontier 
λ(a, r) = 0 do not contribute to total deprivation in the population. Said differently, 
the measure π(a, r; λ) is continuous in (a, r) at λ(a, r) = 0.  
The third line of (5) says that an increase in either a or r decreases deprivation. 
An improvement in welfare, absolute of relative, this decreases deprivation.  
Finally, the last line of (5) says that an increase in a increases πr (a, r; λ): the 
greater the value of a, the lower the fall in deprivation that is brought about by an 
increase in r. This also says that the types of deprivation are “substitutes”. 
Let ΔP (π, λ) = PB (π, λ) − PA (π, λ) and ΔH (za , zr) = HB (za , zr) − HA (za , 
zr). The following equivalence can be shown (the proof follows from Duclos, 
Sahn, and Younger 2006): 
 
Proposition 1 (Joint dominance over absolute and relative deprivation judge-
ments) 
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Proposition 1 says that to be able to conclude that joint absolute/relative 
deprivation is lower in distribution B than in distribution A for all indices in Π(λ+), 
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it is necessary and sufficient that the intersection headcount H (za,zr) be lower in B 
for all of the possible intersection poverty lines (za , zr) in Λ(λ+). 
2.2 Absolute and Relative Deprivation in the Income Dimension 
The result of Proposition 1 shows how to make joint absolute and relative pro-poor 
judgements that are robust to broad classes of specifications of π and λ. The only 
restrictions that need to be imposed on π and λ are given by (2) and (5).  
This still leaves open the choice of the a and r indicators. The most popular 
ways to assess absolute and relative welfare and poverty/deprivation are based on 
the use of income (or consumption). This is also what we will do in the application 
section below. Denoting income as y, we therefore express a and r as functions 
aj(y) and rj(y). The superscripts j express the possible dependence of these 
functions on the distribution j in which the incomes are observed. aj(y) and rj(y) 
therefore stand for the absolute and relative welfare of someone with income y in a 
distribution j. We then have: 
 
∫Λ= )( ).());(),((),( λ λπλπ ydFyryaP
jjjj  (7) 
 
In pursuing this route, it is useful to ensure that the aggregation procedure 
described in (7) incorporates both absolute and relative standards of income 
deprivation. A formal treatment of such standards is provided in Duclos (2009). It 
is sometimes argued that a change is good for the poor if it increases the poor's 
absolute living standards (see Ravallion and Chen 2003 for instance); this is the 
main justification for incorporating absolute welfare concerns in the pro-poor 
judgements. It is also sometimes posited that growth should be judged to be pro-
poor only if it benefits more, or harms less, the poor than the non-poor (see 
Kakwani and Pernia 2000 for instance); this is the main motivation for 
incorporating relative welfare concerns in the pro-poor judgements. 
Take the case of absolute welfare, again measured by aj (y). The following 
axiom circumscribes it. 
 
Axiom 1 a j (y) captures concerns for absolute welfare if and only if 
 
∫∫ = )());(),(()());(),(( ydFyryaydFyrya jjijjj λπλπ  
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for all possible distributions Fi(y) and F j(y). 
 
Axiom 1 says that pro-poor judgements should remain invariant to whether we 
use ai(y) or aj(y) to take into account concerns for absolute welfare in P j (π, λ). 
This is an invariance property that essentially forces the function aj(y) not to 
depend on j; said differently, we should have that a(y)= ai(y)=aj(y). Given the 
general formulation of the function π, we can, without loss of generality, therefore 
just set a(y) = y. 
Now take the case of relative welfare, which is captured by rj(y). r j(y) will 
generally take into account the distribution of income Fj(·) when it comes to assess 
the relative welfare of someone with y in j. That will also take into account the 
change in the distribution of income when we assess by how much the incomes of 
the poor must change to “catch up” with the change in the overall distribution of 
income. Let Fj,γ(y) = Fj(γy) and rj,γ(y) be defined relative to the distribution Fj,γ(y). 
Fj,γ(y) is thus obtained by scaling (dividing) the distribution of incomes in j by γ. 
 
Axiom 2 r j (y) captures relative welfare concerns if and only if, for all γ > 0, 
 
∫∫ = )());(,()());(,( ,, ydFyryydFyry jjjj γγ λγπλπ  
 
for all possible distributions Fj(y). 
 
Axiom 2 assesses deprivation in two distributions, one with j's incomes, and 
one with j's incomes divided by γ. If absolute welfare is adjusted to be the same in 
the two distributions (by multiplying y by γ), then Axiom 2 says that deprivation 
should be judged the same in the two distributions. Said differently, pro-poor 
judgements should remain invariant to whether we use Fj(y) or Fj,γ(y) for 
aggregating relative welfare. Scaling incomes up or down should not affect 
relative welfare. This is an invariance property that essentially also forces the 
function rj(y) to be homogeneous of degree 0 in y and in the distribution of 
incomes Fj(·). 
There are many ways for enforcing this homogeneity property. One of the 
simplest ways is to normalize incomes in rj(y) by a summary statistic of the 
income distribution j that is homogeneous of degree 1 in the income distribution. 
The mean is an obvious and common candidate to do this in the context of relative 
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poverty comparisons — though other distribution-dependent statistics such as the 
median or the mode could also be applied. This is what we use in this paper's 
application in Section 3, in accordance with most of the existing literature on 
assessing relative pro-poorness. Letting the mean of distribution j be µ j = 
∫ )(yydF j , this is formally equivalent to imposing the following axiom. 
 
Axiom 3 r j (y) is defined as mean-normalized relative welfare if and only if, 
for all γ > 0, 
 
∫∫ = )());(,()());(,( , ydFyryydFyry
jjjjj µλµπλπ  
 
for all possible distributions F j (y), and where r(y) is independent of the 
distribution Fj(·). 
 
Given the general formulation of the function π, we can then set r j (y) = y/µ j 
without loss of generality. Note that this framework is general enough to 
accommodate negative as well as positive income growth. This leads to joint 
absolute/relative indices of the form: 
 
∫Λ= )( )();/,(),( λ λµπλπ ydFyyP
jjj
 
(8) 
 
2.3 Comparing Absolute and Relative Income Deprivation 
Using (3), (8) and Proposition 1, we therefore have that ΔP (π, λ) < 0, 
)(),( +Π∈∀ λλπP  (where the P are absolute/relative income deprivation indices) 
if and only if ΔH∗ (z a , z r) < 0, )(),( +Λ∈∀ λra zz , where  
 
∫ ≤≤= )()/()(),(* ydFzyIzyIzzH jrjaraj µ  (9)  
The fact that both a and r depend solely on y leads to a simplification of the 
general testing procedure described in Proposition 1. To see this, consider Figure 
2. Absolute income is shown on the horizontal axis (y), and relative income is 
shown on the vertical one (y/µ). The lines j = A and j = B show where incomes lie 
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for the two distributions. The slope of each line is given by 1/µ j. Testing for joint 
absolute and relative deprivation amounts to comparing the proportion of 
individuals lying within a rectangle that starts at (0, 0) and that ends at (z a , z r). 
First assume that mean income has increased in moving from A to B, as is also 
implicitly assumed in Figure 2. Individuals are concentrated on the lines A and B. 
Marginal dominance can be checked by comparing F j,1 (z a) at different z a for 
checking absolute welfare dominance, and by comparing F j,µj (z r ) at various z r 
for checking relative welfare dominance. This leads to a few interesting 
relationships (again, for the case in which µ A < µ B). 
1. First assume, as in Figure 2, that F B,µB (z r) ≤ F A,µA (z r) for z r Є ]0, z0r]. 
This implies that F B (µ B z0r) = F B (z0a) ≥ F A (µ A z0r). F B (z0a) on Figure 2 
is the proportion of individuals in population B that are lying on segment od. 
F A (z0a) is the proportion of individuals in population A that are lying on 
segment oc. Also assume that F B,µB (z r) > F A,µA (z r) for z r > z0r. Then, it 
must be that F B (z a) ≤ F A (z a) for z a Є ]0, µ A z0r], where µ A z0r = z0a in 
Figure 2. It must indeed also be that ΔH∗ (z a, z r) < 0 for all (z a , z r) in ]0, 
∞[⊗]0, z0r]. Therefore, if a distribution B with a higher mean than A 
relatively dominates A, then it must also be that B dominates A over some 
Π(λ). This area Λ(λ) is the dashed area on Figure 2. 
2. Suppose in addition that F B (z a) ≤ F A (z a) for z a Є ]0, z1a], and that F B (z 
a) > F A (z a) for z a > z1a. By the above, it must be that z0a ≤ z1a. It must then 
also be that ΔH∗ (z a , z r) < 0 for all (z a, z r) in ]0, z0a]⊗]0, ∞]. This area 
Λ(λ) is the dotted area on Figure 2. 
3. Under the above setting, there also exists an area between z0a and z1a where 
ΔH∗ (za, z r) < 0. This is the shaded area on Figure 2 that is bounded to the 
right by the line that links point d to point e. 
4. To sum up, if µ A < µ B and if for some z0r we have that F B,µB (z r) ≤ F A,µA (z 
r) for zr Є ]0, z0r], we also have that ΔH∗ (z a, z r) < 0, over the area Λ(λ+) 
shown jointly by the dashed, the dotted and the shaded areas in Figure 2. 
This also says that all of the indices that are members of the absolute/relative 
class Π(λ+) will necessarily declare a movement from A to B to be pro-poor. 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  12 
Figure 2: Joint absolute and relative pro-poor growth 
 
A similar and symmetric reasoning applies to the case in which the movement 
from A to B generates a fall in average income, that is, if µ A > µ B. If a distribution 
A with a higher mean than B relatively dominates B, then it must also be that A 
dominates B over some absolute/relative poverty indices Π(λ+). This also says that 
all of the indices that are members of the absolute/relative class Π(λ+) will declare 
the movement from A to B to be anti-poor.  
Note finally that the class Π(λ+) of pro-poor indices includes multidimensional 
indices that can be of the intersection, union or intermediate types. All that is 
required is that those indices be defined within the area Λ(λ+). This is despite the 
fact that, to test for robustness of pro-poor assessments over the class Π(λ+), 
intersection indices of the type (9) must be used. 
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3 Application 
3.1 Data and Estimation Procedures 
We illustrate the application of the method introduced above by applying it to 
relatively recent distributional changes in nine African countries. This is of interest 
in itself given the considerable importance that African development has had in 
international policy circles. The nine countries are the Central African Republic 
(CAR), Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa 
and Tunisia; the covered periods range from 1993 to 2007. As will become clear 
below, these countries have experienced sometimes quite different patterns of 
growth and poverty changes over that period. They had been selected in part 
because of these different growth experiences and because they cover a wide 
geographical range. 
The household data on Mauritius are obtained from the Central Statistics 
Office’s seventh and eighth Household Budget Surveys (2001/2002 and 
2005/2006)—see http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/. The household data on South 
Africa have been collected into the Surveys on the income and expenditure of 
households (1995/1996 and 2005/2006) by Statistics South Africa—see 
http://www.statssa.gov for more information.  
Except for Mauritius and South Africa, for which we had access to the 
household level data, the welfare distributions are obtained by reconstructing 
individual expenditure observations from information on cumulative expenditure 
shares—namely, Lorenz curve coordinates. The procedure followed to reconstruct 
individual expenditure observations is that suggested by Shorrocks and Wan 
(2008). In contrast to several alternative methods, this procedure ensures that the 
Lorenz curve ordinates of the reconstructed samples match exactly those that are 
initially used.1  
Most of the cumulative expenditure shares are available on the World Bank's 
PovCalNet web site (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp). Lorenz curve 
ordinates have also been obtained from other sources: Ministère des Affaires 
Economiques et du Développement (2006) for the 2004 Mauritanian expenditure 
_________________________ 
1 For this purpose, we have used the latest version of the Distributive Analysis Stata 
Package (DASP) of Araar and Duclos (2007), which readily applies this procedure. 
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distribution, and Institut National de la Statistique (2007) for 2005 Tunisian 
cumulative expenditure shares.  
To compare poverty across time and countries, we need measurement units 
that are comparable across time and space. This is readily provided by the 
PovCalNet data. The per capita expenditure data obtained from sources other than 
PovcalNet are transformed into 2005 prices using the consumer price indices 
published by the national authorities of each country. These expenditures are then 
converted into 2005 US dollars using the 2005 purchasing power parities (PPP) 
found in PovcalNet for Mauritania and those 2005 PPP found in World Bank 
(2008) for Mauritius, South Africa and Tunisia. PPP are commonly used for 
comparing absolute poverty and social welfare; such cross-country comparisons 
should, however, be interpreted with caution since they can be sensitive to 
marginal changes in the PPP. Relative poverty comparisons are not, however, 
sensitive to changes in national PPP.2 Note also that differences in the construction 
of consumption aggregates and in adjustments for differences in spatial prices 
further make comparisons across the countries difficult. 
Standard errors and confidence intervals for Mauritius’ and South Africa’s 
poverty estimates are computed taking account sampling weights and sampling 
design information. It is unfortunately not possible to compute standard errors and 
confidence intervals with the same rigor for the poverty estimates of those 
countries for which we do not have access to the micro data and for which we 
must instead reconstruct individual expenditure observations. The most important 
reason for this is that the Lorenz curves estimates used for those countries do not 
tell us anything about the sampling design effect of the surveys initially used to 
compute those Lorenz curves estimates.  
To provide a rough idea of the sampling variability of the poverty estimates for 
those other seven countries, we nevertheless compute and provide standard errors 
on poverty estimates assuming that these estimates come from a survey of 1000 
independently and identically drawn individual expenditure observations. This 
number contrasts with the true sample size of the surveys initially used to compute 
the Lorenz curves estimates, a sample size that is usually between 10,000 to 
12,000 observations. All of these initial surveys are, however, made of clusters of 
_________________________ 
2 See for example Chen et al. (1994) for a discussion of the use of PPP for international 
comparisons of poverty. 
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around 10 to 12 observations each. Such clustering has the well-known effect of 
increasing substantially the sampling variability of the poverty estimates computed 
from the reconstructed data. The assumption of a sample size of only 1000 
observations (instead of 10,000 to 12,000) is made to allow roughly for this 
clustering effect. Our checks of the validity of this procedure to compute standard 
errors (based on the use of those two micro data to which we have access) suggest 
that the standard errors thus obtained are not far from (and slightly larger than) 
those that would be computed by properly using the true underlying micro data 
and sampling design information.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on average daily per capita expenditures 
across the countries, the incidence of absolute poverty (H∗ (z a, ∞)) for a poverty 
line z a set at “2 dollars a day” for those countries whose mean per capita 
expenditure was above 2 dollars and “1 dollar a day” for the other three countries 
(CAR, Ethiopia and Malawi), the incidence of relative poverty (H∗ (∞, z r)) for a 
poverty line z r set at half of mean expenditure, and the Gini index. 
Table 1 shows that the mean per capita expenditure of the second group (CAR, 
Ethiopia and Malawi) is not far from the conventional “1 dollar a day” poverty 
line. This naturally leads to high absolute poverty rates as compared with the 
relative poverty rates of these countries. For example, Malawi had an absolute 
poverty rate of 61.2 percent and a relative poverty rate of 25.4 percent in 2004. 
With the notable exceptions of Egypt and Mauritania, the other countries 
(including South Africa) show levels of absolute poverty rates by far lower than 
the relative incidence of poverty. 
One may also remark that all countries have witnessed a fall in absolute 
poverty, even if it is not quite significant in Mauritius and South Africa. 
Conversely, these latter two countries plus Egypt have experienced a significant 
increase in their relative poverty rates.  
The second group of countries (CAR, Ethiopia and Malawi) has witnessed the 
most important decline in both absolute and relative poverty. The results are 
shown in Figures A1, A3 and A5, and can be seen to be statistically significant. 
CAR has experienced a reduction of 25.8 points of percentage in the incidence of 
absolute poverty between 1993 and 2003, and a decline of 19.2 points in the 
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incidence of relative poverty. All other countries with the exception of Tunisia 
have recorded an increase in relative poverty. No country has registered an 
increase in both absolute and relative poverty.  
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 CAR Ethiopia  Malawi  
 1993 2003 Δ 1995 2005 Δ 1997 2004 Δ 
Mean p.c 
expenditure 
0.84 
(0.07) 
1.4 
(0.06) 
0.55 
(0.02) 
1.51 
(0.09) 
1.71 
(0.06) 
0.20 
(0.04) 
0.98 
(0.08) 
1.14 
(0.06) 
0.15 
(0.03) 
H∗ (z a, ∞) 
$1 a day 
76.8 
(1.9) 
51.0 
(2.2) 
-25.8 
(1.96) 
43.6 
(2.2) 
21.4 
(1.8) 
-22.2 
(1.9) 
75.4 
(1.9) 
61.2 
(2.2) 
-14.2 
(1.6) 
H∗ (∞, z r) 
z r = 0.5µ 
52.4 
(2.94) 
33.2 
(2.2) 
-19.2 
(2.03) 
24.4 
(3.3) 
11.6 
(2.8) 
-12.8 
(2.2) 
39.2 
(4.3) 
25.4 
(2.6) 
-13.8 
(2.5) 
Gini Index 61.6 
(2.65) 
43.6 
(1.8) 
-18 
(1.03) 
39.9 
(3.0) 
29.7 
(1.8) 
-10.2 
(1.3) 
50.2 
(3.51) 
39.0 
(2.3) 
-11.2 
(1.31) 
Number of 
observations 
500 500  500 500  500 500  
 Egypt  Mauritania Mauritius 
 1995 2004 Δ 1995 2004 Δ 2002 2007 Δ 
Mean p.c 
expenditure 
3.26 
(0.1) 
3.75 
(0.12) 
0.49 
(0.03) 
2.62 
(0.1) 
3.62 
(0.2) 
1 
(0.08) 
8.7 
(0.1) 
9.66 
(0.1) 
0.96 
(.) 
H∗ (z a, ∞) 
$2 a day 
25.0 
(1.9) 
17.8 
(1.7) 
-7.2 
(1.2) 
48.6 
(2.2) 
30.6 
(2.1) 
-18 
(1.7) 
1.17 
(0.15) 
0.9 
(0.15) 
-0.27 
(0.22) 
H∗ (∞, z r) 
z r = 0.5µ 
11.2 
(1.6) 
14.0 
(1.8) 
2.8 
(0.7) 
24.4 
(1.8) 
24.4 
(2.4) 
0.0 
(0.8) 
17.8 
(0.6) 
20.5 
(0.6) 
2.67 
(0.9) 
Gini Index 30.0 
(1.2) 
32.0 
(1.4) 
2.0 
(0.1) 
37.3 
(1.3) 
39.3 
(2.0) 
2 
(0.8) 
34 
(0.5) 
35.6 
(0.5) 
1.67 
(0.7) 
Number of 
observations 
500 500  500 500  6710 6720  
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Table 1 continued 
 Morocco South Africa Tunisia 
 1998 2007 Δ 1995 2005 Δ 1995 2005 Δ 
Mean p.c 
expenditure 
4.33 
(0.2) 
5.38 
(0.2) 
1.05 
(0.06) 
8.67 
(0.12) 
10.8 
(0.23) 
2.1 
(.) 
5.14 
(0.2) 
7.26 
(0.3) 
2.12 
(0.1) 
H∗ (z a, ∞) 
$2 a day 
22.6 
(1.9) 
13.0 
(1.5) 
-9.6 
(1.3) 
26.5 
(1.3) 
24.6 
(0.5) 
-1.97 
(1.4) 
19.6 
(1.8) 
7.8 
(1.2) 
-11.8 
(1.4) 
H∗ (∞, z r) 
z r = 0.5µ 
27.0 
(2.1) 
27.2 
(2.3) 
0.2 
(0.3) 
55.0 
(0.76) 
64.0 
(0.6) 
9.0 
(0.97) 
30.6 
(2.0) 
29.2 
(2.1) 
-1.4 
(0.5) 
Gini Index 39.4 
(1.5) 
40.5 
(1.6) 
1.1 
(0.1) 
61.5 
(0.6) 
67.3 
(0.5) 
5.8 
(0.7) 
41.6 
(1.5) 
41.3 
(1.6) 
-0.3 
(0.1) 
Number of 
observations 
500 500  29582 21144  500 500  
N.B. H∗ (z a, ∞) has been set at “$2 a day” rate for countries whose mean per capita expenditure was 
above $2 and “$1 a day” rate for other countries (CAR, Ethiopia and Malawi). Standard errors appear 
within the parentheses. 
These results prevent conventional first-order relative pro-poorness in Egypt, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco and South Africa because although these 
countries have experienced a decrease in their absolute poverty rates, their relative 
poverty rates have risen. Since a fall in the relative poverty rates is necessary for 
joint absolute and relative pro-poor dominance, the fact that relative poverty rates 
have increased also prevents bidimensional pro-poorness over Λ(λ +). This is 
visible from the univariate stochastic dominance tests of Figure A7 for Egypt, 
Figure A9 for Mauritania, Figure A11 for Mauritius, Figure A13 for Morocco and 
Figure A15 for South Africa. On the left-hand side of each of these figures, 
absolute poverty incidence H j (za, ∞) for country j at each of the two time periods 
is drawn at the top for different za, while absolute poverty differences ΔH(z a) are 
plotted at the bottom for the same range of z a (along with 95 percent confidence 
intervals). On the right-hand side, the relative poverty headcount, H j (∞, z r), is 
displayed at the top for different z r starting from 0 to 100 or 150 percent of mean 
per capita expenditure, µ j, whereas relative poverty differences, ΔH j (z a), are 
depicted at the bottom. 
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3.3 Joint Absolute and Relative Pro-Poorness 
The results of the bivariate stochastic dominance tests formally described in 
Proposition 1 are shown in Figure A2 for CAR, Figure A4 for Ethiopia, Figure A6 
for Malawi, Figure A8 for Egypt, Figure A10 for Mauritania, Figure A12 for 
Mauritius, Figure A14 for Morocco, Figure A16 for South Africa and Figure A18 
for Tunisia. The front axis shows the range of absolute poverty lines (za); the right 
axis shows the range of relative poverty lines (zr); and the vertical axis shows the 
difference in the joint incidence of absolute and relative deprivation (ΔH∗ (z a, z r)) 
at the points defined in the (y, y/µ j) domain. Note that the unidimensional graphs 
discussed above are in fact the lateral views of the bidimensional graphs discussed 
in this section. 
If ΔH∗ (z a, z r) < 0, )(),( +Λ∈∀ λra zz , then economic growth has been 
unambiguously pro-poor, in the sense that the change will be deemed pro-poor for 
any choice of poverty indices and poverty frontiers in the class Π(λ+). 
On the whole, two sets of countries strike out of the figures.3 The first set 
includes countries that have witnessed a robust fall in both absolute and relative 
poverty such as CAR, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritania and Tunisia. The remaining 
countries have witnessed a fall in one of the dimensions of deprivation and a rise 
in the other (Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, and South Africa). 
3.3.1 Pro-poor Growth Experiences  
In the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and Malawi, the tests are conducted for 
an upper z a equal to 5 dollars a day and an upper zr equal to 100 percent of µ j. 
Interestingly enough, these three low-income countries have experienced a robust 
decline both in absolute and in relative poverty. As a result, we can confidently 
conclude that their growth pattern has led to increasing incomes of the poor and 
reducing income inequality. The case of Mauritania and Tunisia is more 
ambiguous as absolute poverty and relative poverty have followed slightly 
different patterns.  
_________________________ 
3 A third set of countries could regroup countries that have experienced a rise in both absolute and 
relative deprivation. These were the cases of Turkey over 1994–2005 and Yemen over 1998–2005 in 
Bibi et al. (2010). 
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The left-hand side of Figure A17 for Tunisia shows that ΔH∗ (z a, ∞) lies 
nowhere above zero (i.e., for z a < 5). Further, for any z a > 1, the negative values 
of ΔH∗ (z a, ∞) are statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. The 
economic growth experienced by Tunisia between 1995 and 2005 has thus 
unambiguously decreased its level of absolute poverty. Said differently, there is 
first-order absolute poverty dominance for Tunisia of 2005 over 1995.4 Figure A9 
shows that Mauritania has experienced a similar statistically significant fall in 
absolute poverty.  
However, the right-hand side of Figure A9 for Mauritania and of Figure A17 
for Tunisia show that ΔH∗ (∞, z r) is not statistically negative for many of the z r Є 
[0, 1]. This means that it is not possible to infer statistically relative poverty 
dominance over all of that range of zr. If we restrict the range of z r to [0, 0.8] for 
Tunisia and [0, 0.4] for Mauritania, and we ignore sampling variability, then we 
can conclude that economic growth has unambiguously decreased relative poverty 
in Tunisia and Mauritania. 
Ignoring sampling variability, the presence of dominance both in the absolute 
and in the relative dimensions of welfare leads to joint pro-poor dominance in 
Tunisia as Figure A18 shows: ΔH∗ (z a, z r) is either nil or negative but is never 
positive for any couple of (z a, z r) in [0, 5] ⊗ [0, 0.8]. A similar ﬁnding applies to 
Mauritania but within a narrower range of z r. Figure A4 shows indeed that there is 
bivariate pro-poor dominance in Mauritania for any (z a, z r) in [0, 5] ⊗ [0, 0.4].  
Putting it differently, the growth pattern in CAR, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritania 
and Tunisia, has mostly led to a two-edged impact on poverty: increased incomes 
for the poor, and increased shares of the poor in total income. This has generated a 
lower degree of joint absolute/relative deprivation as measured by any index 
within Π(λ +). 
3.3.2 Inconclusive Effects of Growth on poverty 
The left-hand side of Figure A7 for Egypt, Figure A11 for Mauritius, and Figure 
A13 for Morocco clearly shows that ΔH∗ (z a, ∞) lies nowhere above zero (i.e., for 
z a < 5). Further, for several z a < 5, ΔH∗ (z a, ∞) is negative with values that are 
_________________________ 
4 Poverty and inequality were, however, on the rise in Tunisia during the first half of the 1990s. More 
details can be found in Bibi and Nabli (2009). 
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statistically negative at the 5 percent level. Economic growth experienced by these 
countries during the last decade or so has therefore tended to decrease absolute 
poverty. However, the right-hand side of these same figures shows that ΔH∗ (∞, z r) 
is either nil or (often) statistically greater than 0 for values of z r within [0, 1]. This 
indicates that we cannot conclude that the latter period dominates the earlier one in 
terms of relative poverty. South Africa shows a somewhat dissimilar pattern of 
economic growth. Absolute poverty has robustly decreased but for a narrow range 
of z a while relative poverty has unambiguously increased, as Figure A15 shows. 
The absence of first-order dominance in the relative dimension of welfare rules 
out bivariate pro-poor dominance as Figure A8 for Egypt, Figure A12 for 
Mauritius Figure A14 for Morocco, and Figure A16 for South Africa show. ΔH∗ (z 
a, z r) shows both positive and negative values, depending on the choice of (z a, z r). 
There can therefore be no robust pro-poor judgment of the evolution of joint 
absolute and relative deprivation in these four countries, even if we ignore 
sampling variability. 
3.4  Discussion 
The above findings suggest that the different performances in terms of poverty 
reduction are country-specific and can also depend on the covered period. For 
example, the poverty analysis conducted by the African Development Bank (2010) 
in Morocco over 1990–1998 shows that the country experienced an absolute anti-
poor growth. The same analysis conducted here over 1998–2007 reveals that 
Morocco has experienced an absolute pro-poor growth. The analysis over the 
entire period would therefore be different from the one presented in this paper.  
The methodology also allows for a consistent joint investigation of absolute 
and relative pro-poorness, a feature not found in earlier papers. It also avoids the 
debate on the choice of poverty lines and poverty indices, which can lead to 
conflicting results and make assessments and comparisons difficult. The paper’s 
methodology may hence result in a definite and robust positive or negative 
response to whether growth has been pro-poor in a specific country. But it can, 
however, also lead to an inconclusive response. Nonetheless, even when the joint 
analysis is not conclusive, the use of graphs can provide useful guidance on the 
country-specific contexts of the impact of growth on absolute and relative poverty.  
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As an example, Egypt has experienced a joint poverty increase up to certain 
coordinates on the axes, a mix picture thereafter, and then a joint decrease. As 
another example, Tunisia has seen a reduction in absolute and relative poverty 
most strikingly among the less poor of the poor. This is different from the 
information provided by the graphs of CAR or Malawi. These latter clearly show 
that extreme poverty has been more particularly reduced than in Egypt and 
Tunisia. A comparison between CAR (Figure A2) and Ethiopia (Figure A4) also 
provides a sense of the relative degree of pro-poorness in these two countries; 
Ethiopia has experienced a more moderate reduction in poverty relative to CAR.  
The results are further suggestive of the importance and the effect of political 
will for poverty reduction. Most of the country analyses cover the period 1995–
2005, a period during which the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) have 
been put in place with an explicit objective of halving extreme poverty by 2015. In 
accordance with this, all of the African countries considered here have experienced 
a decrease in absolute poverty. However, although all low-income countries (CAR, 
Ethiopia, Malawi and Mauritania) have also seen a reduction in relative poverty, 
middle-income countries, with the exception of Tunisia, have not done so.  
As a matter of fact, where poverty reduction has constituted a more official 
policy challenge.5 countries have tended to see a reduction in both absolute and 
relative poverty. Conversely, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco and South Africa have 
witnessed an increase (or have not witnessed a fall) in inequality. It would perhaps 
seem natural and fair to say that poverty reduction strategies have not featured as 
prominently in middle-income countries as in low-income countries. Whether this 
is one reason for the correlation observed in this paper between recent poverty 
alleviation achievements and levels of development is unclear, however. It may 
also be that initial conditions matter: it is plausibly easier to reduce both absolute 
and relative poverty in countries where poverty is initially larger.  
_________________________ 
5 In 1999, CAR launched a “National Poverty Reduction Plan”, Ethiopia prepared an interim Poverty 
Reduction Strategy paper in November 2000, whereas a Poverty Reduction Strategy was launched in 
April 2002 in Malawi and in December 2003 in Mauritania.  
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4 Conclusion 
Poverty reduction has been recently brought to the fore of the analysis of the 
impact of growth on development. There indeed now prevails a wide consensus 
that both the rate and the distributional impact of growth are important in assessing 
its developmental role. This paper offers a method for assessing the joint absolute 
and relative distributive impact of growth through a bivariate test of the pro-
poorness of growth. 
Using this method, we are able to reconcile the absolute and relative 
approaches to assessing poverty and to determine whether distributional changes 
have been robustly pro-poor or anti-poor in nine African countries in the last 
fifteen years. Some of the countries, such as our four lower-income countries as 
well as Tunisia, have seen a robust fall in joint absolute and relative poverty. Other 
countries (Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, and South Africa) have witnessed a fall in 
absolute poverty accompanied by a rise in relative poverty.  
Overall, the paper's results reinforce the view that it is important to focus on 
individual country level experiences when analyzing the impact of growth. They 
are also consistent with the view that although economic growth often leads to a 
robust decline of absolute poverty, it can also simultaneously increase relative 
poverty. In many cases, therefore, whether distributive changes will be deemed to 
be good for the poor will depend on the manner in which the joint assessment of 
absolute and relative pro-poorness is performed.6 
_________________________ 
6 This work was carried out with support from the Poverty and Economic Policy (PEP) Research 
Network, which is financed by the Government of Canada through the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and by the 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). The paper was also inspired by the 
“Growth, Poverty and Inequality” study conducted by the Development Research Department of the 
African Development Bank. However, the views and interpretations in this paper reflect the opinions 
of the authors and not those of the African Development Bank, its Board of Directors or the countries 
they represent. We are grateful to Abdel-Rahmen El-Lahga and Naouel Chtioui for helpful comments 
and Mohamed Amara and Ines Bouassida for research assistance. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1 : Unidimensional poverty dominance curves  
 
Note:  
Central African Republic Povcal Lorenz ordinates 1993–2003 and the procedure of Shorrocks and 
Wan (2008) have been used to reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A2: Bidimensional growth dominance  
 
 
Note: Central African Republic Povcal Lorenz ordinates 1993–2003 and the procedure of Shorrocks 
and Wan (2008) have been used to reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A3: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves  
 
 
Note: Ethiopian Povcal Lorenz ordinates 1995–2005 and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan (2008) 
have been used to reconstruct individual data. 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  26 
Figure A4: Bidimensional growth dominance curves  
 
Note: Ethiopian Povcal Lorenz ordinates 1995–2005 and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan (2008) 
have been used to reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A5: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves  
 
 
Note: Malawi Povcal Lorenz ordinates 1997–2004 and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan (2008) 
have been used to reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A6: Bidimensional growth dominance curves  
 
Note: Malawi Povcal Lorenz ordinates 1997–2004 and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan (2008) 
have been used to reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A7: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves  
 
 
Note: Egyptian Povcal Lorenz ordinates 1995–2004 and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan (2008) 
have been used to reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A8: Bidimensional growth dominance curves  
 
 
Note: Egyptian Povcal Lorenz ordinates 1995–2004 and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan (2008) 
have been used to reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A9: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves  
 
 
Note:  Mauritanian Povcal Lorenz ordinates of 1995, Mauritanian Ministry of Economics and 
Development (2006), Lorenz ordinates of 2004, and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan (2008) to 
reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A10: Bidimensional growth dominance curves  
 
 
Note: Mauritanian Povcal Lorenz ordinates of 1995, Mauritanian Ministry of Economics and 
Development (2006), Lorenz ordinates of 2004, and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan (2008) to 
reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A11: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves  
 
 
Note: Mauritius household surveys 2001/02–2006/07 have been used. 
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Figure A12: Bidimensional growth dominance curves  
 
 
Note: Mauritius household surveys 2001/02–2006/07 have been used. 
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Figure A13: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves  
 
Note: Moroccan Povcal Lorenz ordinates 1998–2007 and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan 
(2008) have been used to reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A14: Bidimensional growth dominance curves  
 
Note: Moroccan Povcal Lorenz ordinates 1998–2007 and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan 
(2008) have been used to reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A15: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves  
 
 
Note: South African household surveys 1995–2005 have been used. 
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Figure A16: Bidimensional growth dominance curves  
 
Note: South African household surveys 1995–2005 have been used. 
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Figure A17: Unidimensional poverty dominance curves  
 
Note: Tunisian Povcal Lorenz ordinates of 1995, Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (2007), 
Lorenz ordinates of 2005, and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan (2008) have been used to 
reconstruct individual data. 
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Figure A18: Bidimensional growth dominance curves  
 
 
Note: Tunisian Povcal Lorenz ordinates of 1995, Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (2007), 
Lorenz ordinates of 2005, and the procedure of Shorrocks and Wan (2008) have been used to 
reconstruct individual data. 
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